Archives for category: Remedial Law

1.  Right to be Notified of Order of Replevin – Upon receiving such order, the sheriff must serve a copy thereof on the adverse party, together with a copy of the application, affidavit and bond, and must forthwith take the property, if it be in the possession of the adverse party, or his agent, and retain it in his custody.

2.)  The property subject of replevin must be kept in a secure place.  After the sheriff has taken possession of the property as herein provided, he must keep it in a secure place and shall be responsible for its delivery to the party entitled thereto upon receiving his fees and necessary expenses for taking and keeping the same.

3.  Right to Object to insufficiency of requirements.  The defendant can object to the sufficiency of the applicant’s bond, or of the surety or sureties thereon.  If he does not so object, he may, at any time before the delivery of the property to the applicant, require the return thereof, by filing with the court where the action is pending a bond executed to the applicant, in double the value of the property as stated in the applicant’s affidavit for the delivery thereof to the applicant, if such delivery be adjudged, and for the payment of such sum to him as may be recovered against the adverse party, and by serving a copy of such bond on the applicant.


The right to appeal is not a constitutional, natural or inherent right — it is a statutory privilege and of statutory origin and, therefore, available only if granted or as provided by statutes. It may be exercised only in the manner prescribed by the provisions of the law.14 The period to appeal is specifically governed by Section 39 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (BP 129),15 as amended, Section 3 of Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, and Section 6 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.

Section 39 of BP 129, as amended, provides:

SEC. 39. Appeals. – The period for appeal from final orders, resolutions, awards, judgments, or decisions of any court in all cases shall be fifteen (15) days counted from the notice of the final order, resolution, award, judgment, or decision appealed from: Provided, however, That in habeas corpus cases, the period for appeal shall be forty-eight (48) hours from the notice of the judgment appealed from.

Section 3, Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states:

SEC. 3. Period of ordinary appeal. ― The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record on appeal is required, the appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty (30) days from notice of the judgment or final order.

The period of appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or reconsideration. No motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration shall be allowed.

Section 6, Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure reads:

SEC. 6. When appeal to be taken. — An appeal must be taken within fifteen (15) days from promulgation of the judgment or from notice of the final order appealed from. This period for perfecting an appeal shall be suspended from the time a motion for new trial or reconsideration is filed until notice of the order overruling the motion has been served upon the accused or his counsel at which time the balance of the period begins to run.

In Neypes, the Court modified the rule in civil cases on the counting of the 15-day period within which to appeal. The Court categorically set a fresh period of 15 days from a denial of a motion for reconsideration within which to appeal, thus:

The Supreme Court may promulgate procedural rules in all courts. It has the sole prerogative to amend, repeal or even establish new rules for a more simplified and inexpensive process, and the speedy disposition of cases. In the rules governing appeals to it and to the Court of Appeals, particularly Rules 42, 43 and 45, the Court allows extensions of time, based on justifiable and compelling reasons, for parties to file their appeals. These extensions may consist of 15 days or more.

To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration.

Henceforth, this “fresh period rule” shall also apply to Rule 40 governing appeals from the Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial Courts; Rule 42 on petitions for review from the Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals; Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the Court of Appeals and Rule 45 governing appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court. The new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order denying the motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final order or resolution.16

The Court also reiterated its ruling that it is the denial of the motion for reconsideration that constituted the final order which finally disposed of the issues involved in the case.

The raison d’être for the “fresh period rule” is to standardize the appeal period provided in the Rules and do away with the confusion as to when the 15-day appeal period should be counted. Thus, the 15-day period to appeal is no longer interrupted by the filing of a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration; litigants today need not concern themselves with counting the balance of the 15-day period to appeal since the 15-day period is now counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration or any final order or resolution.

While Neypes involved the period to appeal in civil cases, the Court’s pronouncement of a “fresh period” to appeal should equally apply to the period for appeal in criminal cases under Section 6 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, for the following reasons:

First, BP 129, as amended, the substantive law on which the Rules of Court is based, makes no distinction between the periods to appeal in a civil case and in a criminal case. Section 39 of BP 129 categorically states that “[t]he period for appeal from final orders, resolutions, awards, judgments, or decisions of any court in all casesshall be fifteen (15) days counted from the notice of the final order, resolution, award, judgment, or decision appealed from.” Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos. When the law makes no distinction, we (this Court) also ought not to recognize any distinction.17

Second, the provisions of Section 3 of Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and Section 6 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, though differently worded, mean exactly the same. There is no substantial difference between the two provisions insofar as legal results are concerned – the appeal period stops running upon the filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration and starts to run again upon receipt of the order denying said motion for new trial or reconsideration. It was this situation that Neypes addressed in civil cases. No reason exists why this situation in criminal cases cannot be similarly addressed.

Third, while the Court did not consider in Neypes the ordinary appeal period in criminal cases under Section 6, Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure since it involved a purely civil case, it did include Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure on petitions for review from the RTCs to the Court of Appeals (CA), and Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure governing appeals by certiorari to this Court, both of which also apply to appeals in criminal cases, as provided by Section 3 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, thus:

SEC. 3. How appeal taken. — x x x x

(b) The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction shall be by petition for review under Rule 42.

In Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Associations, Inc. (CREBA) v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform,[12] a petition for certiorari filed under Rule 65 was dismissed for having been filed directly with the Court, violating the principle of hierarchy of courts, to wit:

Primarily, although this Court, the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts have concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction, such concurrence does not give the petitioner unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. In Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog v. Melicor, citing People v. Cuaresma, this Court made the following pronouncements:

This Court’s original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari is not exclusive. It is shared by this Court with Regional Trial Courts and with the Court of Appeals. This concurrence of jurisdiction is not, however, to be taken as according to parties seeking any of the writs an absolute, unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to which application therefor will be directed. There is after all a hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is determinative of the venue of appeals, and also serves as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs. A becoming regard for that judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level (“inferior”) courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals. A direct invocation of the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. This is [an] established policy. It is a policy necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon the Court’s time and attention which are better devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further over-crowding of the Court’s docket. (Emphasis supplied.)

Similarly, there are no special and important reasons that petitioners cite to justify their direct recourse to this Court under Rule 65.

On the other hand, direct recourse to this Court has been allowed for petitions filed under Rule 45 when only questions of law are raised, as in this case.  Thus, the Court ruled in Barcenas v. Tomas:[13]

Section 1 of Rule 45 clearly states that the following may be appealed to the Supreme Court through a petition for review by certiorari: 1) judgments; 2) final orders; or 3) resolutions of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court or similar courts, whenever authorized by law. The appeal must involve only questions of law, not of fact.

This Court has, time and time again, pointed out that it is not a trier of facts; and that, save for a few exceptional instances, its function is not to analyze or weigh all over again the factual findings of the lower courts. There is a question of law when doubts or differences arise as to what law pertains to a certain state of facts, and a question of fact when the doubt pertains to the truth or falsity of alleged facts.

Under the principle of the hierarchy of courts, decisions, final orders or resolutions of an MTC should be appealed to the RTC exercising territorial jurisdiction over the former. On the other hand, RTC judgments, final orders or resolutions are appealable to the CA through either of the following: an ordinary appeal if the case was originally decided by the RTC; or a petition for review under Rule 42, if the case was decided under the RTC’s appellate jurisdiction.

Nonetheless, a direct recourse to this Court can be taken for a review of the decisions, final orders or resolutions of the RTC, but only on questions of law. Under Section 5 of Article VIII of the Constitution, the Supreme Court has the power to

(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:

x x x x

(e) All cases in which only an error or question of law is involved.

This kind of direct appeal to this Court of RTC judgments, final orders or resolutions is provided for in Section 2(c) of Rule 41, which reads:

SEC. 2. Modes of appeal.¾

x x x x

(c) Appeal by certiorari.¾In all cases where only questions of law are raised or involved, the appeal shall be to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45.

Procedurally then, petitioners could have appealed the RTC Decision affirming the MTC (1) to this Court on questions of law only; or (2) if there are factual questions involved, to the CA — as they in fact did. Unfortunately for petitioners, the CA properly dismissed their petition for review because of serious procedural defects. This action foreclosed their only available avenue for the review of the factual findings of the RTC. (Emphasis supplied.)

In Artistica Ceramica, Inc. v. Ciudad Del Carmen Homeowner’s Association, Inc.,[14] citing Republic v. Court of Appeals,[15] the Court noted that it has the discretion to determine whether a petition was filed under Rule 45 or 65 of the Rules of Court:

The Supreme Court, in accordance with the liberal spirit pervading the Rules of Court and in the interest of justice, has the discretion to treat a petition for certiorari as having been filed under Rule 45, especially if filed within the reglementary period for filing a petition for review.

The Supreme Court in the case of Daan vs. Sandiganbayan (G.R. Nos. 163972-77, March 28, 2008) explained what Plea Bargaining and how parties go through its process:

Plea bargaining in criminal cases is a process whereby the accused and the prosecution work out a mutually satisfactory disposition of the case subject to court approval.  It usually involves the defendant’s pleading guilty to a lesser offense or to only one or some of the counts of a multi-count indictment in return for a lighter sentence than that for the graver charge.

Plea bargaining is authorized under Section 2, Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, to wit:

SEC. 2. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense. — At arraignment, the accused, with the consent of the offended party and the prosecutor, may be allowed by the trial court to plead guilty to a lesser offense which is necessarily included in the offense charged. After arraignment but before trial, the accused may still be allowed to plead guilty to said lesser offense after withdrawing his plea of not guilty. No amendment of the complaint or information is necessary.  (sec. 4, cir. 38-98)

Ordinarily, plea bargaining is made during the pre-trial stage of the proceedings. Sections 1 and 2, Rule 118 of the Rules of Court, require plea bargaining to be considered by the trial court at the pre-trial conference,[8] viz:

SEC. 1.   Pre-trialmandatory in criminal cases.In all criminal cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Municipal Trial Court and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, the court shall, after arraignment and within thirty (30) days from the date the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the accused, unless a shorter period is provided for in special laws or circulars of the Supreme Court, order a pre-trial conference to consider the following:

(a) plea bargaining;(b) stipulation of facts;

(c) marking for identification of evidence of the parties;

(d) waiver of objections to admissibility of evidence;

(e) modification of the order of trial if the accused admits the charge but interposes a lawful defense; and

(f) such matters as will promote a fair and expeditious trial of the criminal and civil aspects of the case.

SEC. 2.  Pre-trial agreement. – All agreements or admissions made or entered during the pre-trial conference shall be reduced in writing and signed by the accused and counsel, otherwise, they cannot be used against the accused.  The agreements covering the matters referred to in section 1 of this Rule shall be approved by the court. (Emphasis supplied)

But it may also be made during the trial proper and even after the prosecution has finished presenting its evidence and rested its case. Thus, the Court has held that it is immaterial that plea bargaining was not made during the pre-trial stage or that it was made only after the prosecution already presented several witnesses.

Section 2, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court presents the basic requisites upon which plea bargaining may be made, i.e., that it should be with the consent of the offended party and the prosecutor, and that the plea of guilt should be to a lesser offense which is necessarily included in the offense charged.  The rules however use word may in the second sentence of Section 2, denoting an exercise of discretion upon the trial court on whether to allow the accused to make such plea. Trial courts are exhorted to keep in mind that a plea of guilty for a lighter offense than that actually charged is not supposed to be allowed as a matter of bargaining or compromise for the convenience of the accused.

In People of the Philippines v. Villarama (G.R. No. 99287, June 23, 1992, 210 SCRA 246), the Court ruled that the acceptance of an offer to plead guilty to a lesser offense is not demandable by the accused as a matter of right but is a matter that is addressed entirely to the sound discretion of the trial court, viz:

x x x In such situation, jurisprudence has provided the trial court and the Office of the Prosecutor with a yardstick within which their discretion may be properly exercised. Thus, in People v. Kayanan (L-39355, May 31, 1978, 83 SCRA 437, 450), We held that the rules allow such a plea only when the prosecution does not have sufficient evidence to establish the guilt of the crime charged. In his concurring opinion in People v. Parohinog (G.R. No. L-47462, February 28, 1980, 96 SCRA 373, 377), then Justice Antonio Barredo explained clearly and tersely the rationale or the law:

x x x (A)fter the prosecution had already restedthe only basis on which the fiscal and the court could rightfully act in allowing the appellant to change his former plea of not guilty to murder to guilty to the lesser crime of homicide could be nothing more nothing less than the evidence already in the record. The reason for this being that Section 4 of Rule 118 (now Section 2, Rule 116) under which a plea for a lesser offense is allowed was not and could not have been intended as a procedure for compromise, much less bargaining. (Emphasis supplied)

However, Villarama involved plea bargaining after the prosecution had already rested its case.

For a sample of a Offer of Plea Bargaining, email

Question: Can an excessive bail bond recommendation be reduced?

Scenario:  Two carpenters on their way home figured in a brawl with street toughies (“istambays”).   As they were constrained to defend themselves with their carpentry tools (hammers and wood chisels), they were able to inflict physical injuries to their assailants.  However, the public prosecutor charged them with frustrated murder and recommended bail at P 120,000 each.

Answer: Yes.  Excessive bail can be reduced.  Legal basis is Sec. 20. Rule 114, The Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure which provides that:

Increase or reduction of bail. – After the accused is admitted to bail, the court may, upon good cause, either increase or reduce its amount. When increased, the accused may be committed to custody if he does not give bail in the increased amount within a reasonable period. An accused held to answer a criminal charge, who is released without bail upon filing of the complaint or information, may, at any subsequent stage of the proceedings and whenever a strong showing of guilt appears to the court, be required to give bail in the amount fixed, or in lieu thereof, committed to custody.

The Civil Code of the Philippines even sanctions those who do not reduce an excessive bail:

Article 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages:

xxx   xxx  xxx

(15) The right of the accused against excessive bail;

xxx   xxx  xxx


For a sample of a motion for reduction of bail, email


Usual Scenarios of Property Partition:

Case No.1 – The one or both the parents  passed away.Children are left with properties in the name of the parents.  How can they subdivided these properties and registered the same in their names.

Case No. 2 – The parents already died. One of the children wants to transfer the properties of his parents to himself but other siblings do not agree.

The  first case can be solved by execution of an deed of extra-judicial partition.  This can be done if the requirements stated in Rule 74 Section 1 of the Rules of Court are present:

1. The decedent (parents who died)  left no will.
2. The decedent left no debts, or if there were debts left, all had been paid.
3. The heirs (children) are all of age, or if they are minors, the latter are represented by their judicial guardian or legal representatives.
4. The partition was made by means of a public instrument or affidavit duly filed with the Register of Deeds.

The affidavit must be executed by the heirs and must contain the necessary allegations to support a valid extrajudicial settlement of estate. The affidavit shall be published in a newspaper of general circulation, once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks.

For a sample of a Deed of Extra judicial Partition, email

In the second case,  the child who demands that the properties of his dead parents should be partitioned and distributed to the heirs may file  an ordinary action for partition under Rule 69 of the Rules of Court. Under the said rule, a person having the right to compel partition of real estate may file a complaint in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of the province where the real property or part thereof is located. If several distinct parcels of land are situated in different provinces, venue may be laid in the RTC of any of said provinces.

The complaint for partition shall set forth the nature and extent of the complainant’s title and an adequate description of the real estate of which partition is demanded and joining as defendants all other persons interested in the property (Section 1, Rule 69 Rules of Court).

For a sample of a Petition for Judicial Partition, email